BA-10 at the Height of Power

It was not a surprise that armoured cars quickly made way for tanks in the food chain of the battlefield. The problem with an armoured car is its chassis. Even the best car falls short of a tank, especially when it comes to cross-country terrain. Because of this armoured cars were relegated to reconnaissance and signals duties. The Red Army was no exception.

It just so happens that there are no aces among armoured car crews due to the special place they occupy on the battlefield. However, that was not always the case. For instance, BA-10 armoured cars played an important part in the battle for Bain-Tsagan and not as a method of reconnaissance.

The BA-10 began to enter service around the end of 1938. By the Battle of Khalkhin-Gol, it was used by the 8th and 9th Motorized Armour Brigades of the 57th Special Corps. This vehicle was a big step forward compared to the BA-3 and BA-6. The armoured car was built with experience from the Spanish Civil War in mind, especially when it came to its armour.

One can see an interesting nuance when looking at the composition of armoured forces at Khalkhin-Gol. Medium armoured cars were used as a wheeled tank rather than a reconnaissance vehicle. Of course, they were short of the BT tank when it came to speed, but they could move rather briskly in the steppe, especially when wearing Overall chains. The theatre of war was accommodating of wheeled vehicles. It is not surprising that armoured cars surpassed tanks in number here.

BA-10 crew under the command of P.F. Morozov (far right). This crew destroyed a Japanese truck full of infantry. Morozov himself saved the crew of a knocked out armoured car commanded by company politruk Nasyrin.

The BA-10 was most intensely used by the 9th Motorized Armour Brigade. The armoured cars were first used in the end of May 1939, but they were most intensively used in July-August. It just so happened that armoured cars were the main striking force of the Soviet units on the eastern bank of the Khalkh river (Khalkhin Gol) on July 3rd, 1939. They were opposed by the Japanese 3rd and 4th Tank Regiments (87 tanks in total).

The situation on the eastern bank was very interesting, in no small part because both sides attacked at once. Soviet forces crossed the river on the morning of July 3rd, at the same time as Lieutenant General Masaomi Yasuoka ordered an attack. Neither side had a good picture of the other. Recon elements of the 9th brigade discovered the large number of Japanese tanks entirely by accident. Soviet armour was also a surprise for Japanese tankers. Until then, they had never faced enemy tanks in battle. The Japanese set course for the Soviet armoured cars with full confidence of their superiority. Their numbers had an effect and a company of BA-10 stationed in defense began to flee until brigade commander S.I. Oleinikov managed to turn them back. A battle began, in which the BA-10 had an advantage as they were dug in and hull down facing an enemy in an open field. The initial clash cost the Japanese 9 tanks and they lost a total of 19 in that sector that day. In total, the 3rd and 4th regiments lost 41 tanks on July 3rd and July 4th, 13 of them irreparably.

A Japanese officer examines a captured BA-3 armoured car. A BA-10 can be seen behind it.

The BA-10 was used with mixed success. The 9th Motorized Armour Brigade lost 22 BA-10 in that battle, which made up half of all BA-10 at Khalkhin-Gol (41 in total). A part of the lost armoured cars were captured by the Japanese. Nevertheless, the battle of July 3rd was one of the largest successes of these armoured cars in their whole career. However, the battle highlighted the need for certain improvements. For instance, moving the fuel tanks outside of the armoured hull was already something that was considered in early 1939 and Khalkin-Gol just confirmed that this was necessary.

Original article by Yuri Pasholok.