tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5030145265861917845.post2214923474538026046..comments2024-03-28T14:35:30.147-04:00Comments on Tank Archives: Light SPGs with Big GunsPeterhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09622237223229485503noreply@blogger.comBlogger9125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5030145265861917845.post-64816969925491884872019-05-08T19:52:32.912-04:002019-05-08T19:52:32.912-04:00Well sure, but you fight with what you *have* (and...Well sure, but you fight with what you *have* (and have the means to build in quantity to feed the frontlines) not with what you'd *like* to have. Much like the Germans would certainly have dearly liked to swap their assorted mid-late Thirties designs to something more up to date (and with some actual unused modernisation reserve) but practically couldn't due to the harsh realities of having to meet the ever-spiraling demands for more working kit *right this minute*.<br />Production lines take quite a while to get up and running and the enemy is not going to politely wait until you're good and ready from any disruptions of materiel flow, after all.<br /><br />It's not like the Soviets kept the little gunbox around for long after the war when they could finally take a breather and start seriously modernising their TO&Es, either. It served a distinctly useful stopgap purpose in the "everything starting from the kitchen sink" total-war conditions and was unceremoniously retired afterwards, some later being passed on to clients and allies.Kellomieshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04915110653443066212noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5030145265861917845.post-43987837677458545182019-05-08T19:05:03.422-04:002019-05-08T19:05:03.422-04:00But Kellmonies--doesn't the fact that everyone...But Kellmonies--doesn't the fact that everyone essentially quit the idea of the general-purpose light AFV (which is what the SU-76 and its spinoffs were) mean the idea was a dead end? Light AFVs continued, to be sure, but in more specialized areas (recon, amphibious, air-lifts, etc. Plus some of these 'light' vehicles approach the T-34 in weight. Stewart Millenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01261690405884935161noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5030145265861917845.post-6348596302744748362019-05-08T17:26:59.481-04:002019-05-08T17:26:59.481-04:00The 76's own tactical cross-road mobility may ...The 76's own tactical cross-road mobility may have been so-so (the thing could really have used wider tracks) but at 10-11 tons or so it weighed under half of what even the early T-34s (~26 tons) did. That's a pretty major difference when the combat engineers had to start improving (or building out of whole cloth) things like bridges over streams and corduroy roads across marshes for the purposes of strategic and operational maneuvers, as IIRC was amply demonstrated during some of the Bagration offensives in particular.<br /><br />Tactically these things weren't assault vehicles anyway (not that people didn't inevitably try to use them as such ofc; Hell, the dinky little Brit Carriers were occasionally used for such tasks for want of something beefier) but self-propelled direct fire support that protected the gun crew from things like MGs and mortars that often tended to make the improvised use of towed artillery pieces for such tasks unacceptably costly in terms of trained gunners, as had been discovered already during the Winter War. (The KV-2 was more or less directly born from that lesson.) Their niche was to saturate the frontline divisions with "good enough" affordable close support, not breakthrough combat against hardened defensive belts or suchlike - the Red Army had bigger, badder and markedly costlier AFVs for handling such such heavy-combat tasks. (One nice thing about serious prepared defenses was you generally didn't stumble on them by surprise but knew well in advance where they could be expected and could duly deploy suitable assets accordingly, should you now have such available ofc.)<br /><br />Also, last I read about it even flimsy light AFVs tended to actually be fairly economical about casualties; barring ammo explosions or particularly nasty "brew-ups" (and open-top jobs like the SU-76 were comparatively easy to hastily evacuate in extremis) much if not most of the crew of a KO'd vehicle usually survived and could readily enough be returned to action in a new ride if resources allowed - and armoured close support *really* helped reduce infantry casualties by shooting up MG nests and similar grunt-shredders that only too readily stall entire offensives. One Great War French general once quipped something to the effect that "there are two kinds of infantry; those who have never gone into battle accompanied by tanks and those who never want to fight without them again" (very loosely paraphrasing from memory here)...Kellomieshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04915110653443066212noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5030145265861917845.post-45284323580314461772019-05-07T13:57:50.654-04:002019-05-07T13:57:50.654-04:00Thanks to everyone who replied.
My understanding ...Thanks to everyone who replied.<br /><br />My understanding is that the SU-76 regiments were standard (or almost so) attachment units to every rifle corps by 1944-45.<br /><br />I also get William Sager's point, made in an earlier post, about the merits of a specialty vehicle (air-transportable, which the SU-76 and proposed derivatives were not), or light enough/mobile enough in difficult terrain, like swampy areas. This also could make sense as one would assume that the swampy or difficult terrain would make this light SPG far less likely to have to face any AFV or anti-tank guns that could threaten it (the towed guns being limited by the difficulty of truck transport). <br /><br />However, in this case, the SU-76 while it had a bit lower low ground pressure than T-34-based SP guns, wasn't great in off-road mobility, and indeed Soviet cavalry corps usually had T-34s attached and SUs attached anyway. So it's hard to see the merit here.<br /><br />So, as these light SU-76s SPGs were attached to the rifle corps, during the 1944-45 time era one could suppose to be used offensively, providing overwatch support behind the advancing infantry (I've read 300-600 yards behind the infantry was standard). So where would they be most likely used? Well, again, you'd think to overcome stubborn strong points of resistance when the rifle corps lacked any army or front assets for the job (heavy ISU SPGs, medium SPGs, medium or heavy tanks). But what kind of strong point doesn't have even a battery of 50 mm towed AT guns, and that's all it takes to threaten this contraption at the ranges it will be used?<br /><br />David Glantz once mentioned that the problem that German infantry divisions faced starting in 1943 and accelerating in 1944 was that, given the replacement of Soviet light AFV with tanks and SPGs based on the T-34 chassis, that their inventory of AT weapons became inadequate. Their 37 mm guns were useless against these AFV, the 50 mm guns were nearly useless, and there weren't nearly enough 75 mm Pak40s in their divisions to stop any determined Soviet tank attack. Of course the Germans countered by switching more and more of their AFV production into SPG using the Pak40 gun and others, but there weren't enough of these either; they also improved their handheld AT weapons (Panzerfausts) but the handheld stuff had range limitations that made them useless against AFV that provided overwatching fire. Plus, once the Soviets uparmored their SPGs (SU-85M and SU-100) then even the Pak40 guns and AFVs sporting that gun struggled.<br /><br />I see the production advantage of continuing the line of SPGs made with the T-70 chassis, and Kellomies makes a good point about the transportation advantage (by rail, particularly). But still, just from a combat perspective continuing the line doesn't seem productive. By 1944 the biggest Soviet problem was not running out of hardware, it was running out of bodies. The Soviets were already beginning to disband units by then and continuing the use of a light, less survivable, AFVs "burn" crew members and the infantrymen they are supporting (because once the SU goes up in flames, then it's all back on the infantry). By contrast, transitioning to using a more survivable vehicle SU-85Ms or, in my opinion, something like a SU-122M, keeps more of both alive at minimal cost if any in mobility and use.<br /><br />But thanks, you guys raised a lot of good points.<br /><br />Stewart Millenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01261690405884935161noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5030145265861917845.post-28243638390326825162019-05-07T09:24:28.751-04:002019-05-07T09:24:28.751-04:00Not all factories could build a T-34. The reason w...Not all factories could build a T-34. The reason why the T-60 was built in the first place was because it could use automotive components, and automotive factories would have the equipment required to produce it. The T-70 and then the SU-76 were pushing their capacity to its limit as is, it is not surprising that any upgrade was resisted.Peterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09622237223229485503noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5030145265861917845.post-80323900090383962572019-05-06T20:42:05.688-04:002019-05-06T20:42:05.688-04:00I think you are correct. But by 1944 the Soviets w...I think you are correct. But by 1944 the Soviets were already producing as many T-34 variants as possible. Sure every tank crew would of loved having a T-34 or JS Tank or assault derivative. But Russia could build 2 1/2 SU-76's with the same amount of steel as going into one T-34. As the article points out, they felt their best option was to keep the existing tank plants open and just place a larger gun in the existing tanks. Plus I suspect at this time Russia was thinking more of their long term plans to start building amphibious light tanks to cross over rivers. Sager ,William A.https://www.blogger.com/profile/06830369127449299646noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5030145265861917845.post-28885195911982125522019-05-06T04:23:22.667-04:002019-05-06T04:23:22.667-04:00There's also sound industrial/economic/logisti...There's also sound industrial/economic/logistical sense in using a proven and mature platform for which extensive manufacturing infrastructure already exists. Being small and light, ergo easy to ship around and relatively insensitive to lousy terrain and poor transport infra, and dirt cheap to boot are not insignificant bonuses in the niche of cheap and cheerful infantry-support weapon as well.Kellomieshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04915110653443066212noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5030145265861917845.post-83792533243412265662019-05-05T20:50:50.858-04:002019-05-05T20:50:50.858-04:00Certainly the SU-76 wouldn't be able to duke i...Certainly the SU-76 wouldn't be able to duke it out face to face against enemy tanks or tank destroyers, but it wasn't supposed to. The job of the SU-76 is to sit /behind/ infantry and pelt targets they indicate with HE, something like the HMC M8 or a British CS tank. I also don't think that StuGs, Hetzers, or Marders could be called corresponding vehicles. The closes equivalent would be something like a 15 cm sIG 33 (mot S) auf Pz.Kpfw.I Ausf.B. Peterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09622237223229485503noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5030145265861917845.post-20545130561656669212019-05-05T16:18:29.300-04:002019-05-05T16:18:29.300-04:00There seems to be this determination to get *somet...There seems to be this determination to get *something* out of the T-70 chassis, from what I read.<br /><br />I myself question the utility of such a light infantry support vehicle. "When is it most useful?" I ask--and the answer is "when it is supporting your side's infantry against an enemy that can't fight back very well. This means the other side just as small arms, motars and the like, and nothing beyond handheld AT weapons for anti-armor capability (WWII handheld AT weapons can definitely take out a vehicle like an SU-76 or SU-85MB, but assuming these vehicles will be like 300-600 meters behind their infantry, they would be pretty safe). In short, it's great against partisan-type infantry or similar unsupported infantry.<br /><br />Let's up the ante. Now let's give the others side AT gun capability. Not much, mind you, but some. Let's say they have 6 pounders, 57 mm, or 50L60 guns or the equivalent. Oops!! Now even this very modest increase, our light SU-76/SU-85MB is in trouble! Its frontal armor is very penetrable at the ranges it will engage. Up the ante further to a Pak 40, it's very unfavorable. <br /><br />Now give the defenders a corresponding armored vehicle--a Stug, a Hetzer, or even maybe a Marder--and I think the other side has the edge (less so if it's the SU-85MB, though).<br /><br />By contrast, replace our SU-76 or SU-85MB with a SU-85M, or maybe a 122-mm gun equivalent something like a 'SU-122M', then I think your side retains the advantage in all cases. Such vehicle could take frontal hits by even the Pak40 at these ranges and have a good chance of surviving, and certainly would survive hits by smaller-caliber weapons. Both the 85 mm or the 122 mm would take out any the opposing armor I mentioned above without trouble, and the 122 mm would be a fearsome gun against infantry and guns. <br /><br />To top it all off, the off-road mobility of the SU-76 wasn't that great, and its ground pressure wasn't head and shoulders above the competition (like it's loads better in swampy or otherwise difficult terrain). So this seems to scream of a case where "we're making this chassis, can't you guys find a better application of it?" rather than a search for an optimal solution. <br /><br />My two cents, unless someone can explain why I'm wrong.Stewart Millenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01261690405884935161noreply@blogger.com