tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5030145265861917845.post4694910761266254772..comments2024-03-20T11:41:56.776-04:00Comments on Tank Archives: Colossus on Clay FeetPeterhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09622237223229485503noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5030145265861917845.post-4120131679478561402021-04-13T07:43:28.597-04:002021-04-13T07:43:28.597-04:00Agreed; the organization of French tank units, on ...Agreed; the organization of French tank units, on a gross level, looks exactly like US and British practice in 1943-45. All these armies had combined-arms armored divisions (of varying quality of course) as well as numerous smaller tank units tasked to infantry support. <br /><br />I have to agree 100% on the issue of operational execution. French doctrine was not all that bad and certainly it was in advance of most armies - probably only the Germans and USSR had a better doctrine. But the French army was poorly trained and as this article shows, exceptionally unready for war. The German excelled at training, small unit leadership and obviously their readiness was at a very high level. <br /> Danhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08229318142406318607noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5030145265861917845.post-71461752313762579332021-04-04T10:23:11.443-04:002021-04-04T10:23:11.443-04:00Two articles:
https://thestrategybridge.org/the-b...Two articles:<br /><br />https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2018/4/25/doomed-to-defeat-france-1940<br /><br />https://tropicsofmeta.com/2018/07/17/the-nazi-miracle-germanys-unlikely-conquest-of-france/<br /><br />What I take away is:<br /><br />1) The German conquest of France was largely based on a both a huge blunder by the French/British, but also on a big gamble by the Germans. To use a chess analogy, the Germans played a bit like the famous (or infamous) Russian grandmaster Mikhail Tal, who won a lot of games playing risky or even (ultimately) unsound moves that enticed his opponent to walk into a trap. Often they did; and Tal would win. But if they played correctly (and often, the correct move was very non-obvious) they would have the advantage.<br /><br />The French were right--the Ardennes, while not "impassible" was definitely not friendly tank country, as the 1944 offensive showed. The French did not hit the German columns with air strikes, nor sufficiently oppose them with blocking forces. If they had, Guderian's spear thrust would have become more a slog through the mud, and German columns in those woods would have been a tangle. <br /><br />Paradoxically, the French lost not because they were too passive, but because they were too aggressive (as the Larchet article contends). Gamelin's eagerness to seize the initiative led him to commit all his strategic reserves right into the trap the Germans had set. If he had played his instincts, those reserves could have been available to meet Guderian's thrust. <br /><br />As for German tactical superiority, I grant that. But the Germans had tactical superiority over almost everyone through 1943, but were losing then. Tactical superiority doesn't guarantee success And, here I should remind everyone that the French for all those disadvantages in tank warfare, *DID* win the biggest tank battle of the campaign hands-down. So even there, German tactical superiority could have been blunted. <br /><br />The best point you make is the French lack of strategic depth--that unlike the Soviet Union, the French could not yield vast areas of land. But that is only true if you consider Paris the end of the war. I believe rather that it was far more the shock of the quick defeat, rather than the loss of Paris itself, that caused the French to surrender. If the initial German attack had been successfully intercepted, and Paris only falls months or a year later after a grinding campaign, then I think it's likely they *don't* surrender. After all, they not only have the rest of European France to fight from, but also the colonies behind them, and moreover any fight continuing after the capture of Paris against the French army along a front facing south/north leaves the Germans having to worry about a British landing in their rear.Stewart Millenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01261690405884935161noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5030145265861917845.post-10826095472688519832021-03-30T07:04:04.405-04:002021-03-30T07:04:04.405-04:00I think that the thrust of the article is to try t...I think that the thrust of the article is to try to get away from the tactical/operational view and look at the strategic/logistic situation. From that angle, the idea that the French army had the "best tank force in the world" and then squandered it is a myth that needs dispelling.<br /><br />The French failed across all possible battlefield metrics in 1940, and the causes were multifarious. Even so, I think that you can make a case for inevitability here - even with the best luck in the world, and with the French and British operating as the best versions of themselves (ie: not handing victory to the Germans at the outset by poor manoeuvre), I think that France would still have fallen soon. <br /><br />The French position was just too strategically and logistically poor (and the depth of the fight too narrow) to allow them to overcome a German army that was in retrospect nearing its peak.Thom Shttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03200667235769052060noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5030145265861917845.post-85143594692726528532021-03-29T12:18:44.314-04:002021-03-29T12:18:44.314-04:00I'm not sure I agree with the thesis of this a...I'm not sure I agree with the thesis of this article:<br /><br /><i> The fact that France was only able to hold on against Germany for 40 days shocked many. France had the second largest tank force behind only the USSR, and it seemed impossible that this armada could not resist the German advance. However, this defeat was inevitable. </i><br /><br />The defeat of France in 1940 wasn't "inevitable", but more the consequence of poor strategic planning and operational execution. In short, with their feint into the low countries, followed by the spear through the Ardennes at Sedan, the German set a trap for the Allied forces, which the French and British promptly walked straight into. Even if the French had had T-34s and KV-1s they would have lost, based on that blunder.<br /><br />I would classify the problems cited here, along with the lack of radios in French tanks, and a poor communication system between French HQs and field units in general, as things that would have definitely given the Germans an advantage in a stand-up fight, but wouldn't necessarily have won them the battle for France. An analogy would be that in the age of wooden ships, British gunnery was more accurate than their French and Spanish counterparts, which gave the British an advantage, but the British didn't win all the time on the sea, as there were other factors which could come into play.<br /><br />It's also kind of odd that people usually talk about concentrating tanks into tank divisions and whatnot being a decisive advantage for the Germans in 1940, and how distributing out to infantry units was the wrong idea, even though the clear trend later in the war WAS to distribute tank forces among the infantry (German assault gun units, US and British tank battalions/TD battalions, Soviet SU and heavy tank units, etc). Just sayin'.<br />Stewart Millenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01261690405884935161noreply@blogger.com