Thursday 29 November 2018

Finders Keepers


"To the commander of the 22nd Tank Corps
CC: Commander of the 168th Tank Brigade, commander of the 36th Tank Brigade
June 18th, 1942
#0186

In battle at Shevchenkovo, on June 11th, 1942, a T-34 tank with registration number #24-15 belonging to the 168th TBr was knocked out by enemy artillery fire and abandoned by its crew (the commander was Lieutenant Yumashev, who was wounded). An act of the brigade commission consisting of Major Stupakov, Sr. Political Chief Korotyshev, and Lieutenant Sidorin. On June 12th the tank was written off as an irreparable loss as burned up from enemy fire.

Based on the materials I possess, T-34 #24-15 was evacuated from the battlefield by the 36th TBr on June 13th, 1942 with damaged running gear and functional engine (there were no signs of fire). In the nearby forest the tank was brought back into action and drove on its own power to the 36th TBr's repair yard, where it was restored by June 17th, 1942.

Representatives of the 168th TBr, having discovered the tank is battle ready, unlawfully drove the tank from mobile repair base #80 to their own brigade.

In connection with that, I order that:
  1. The commander of the 168th TBr must conduct an investigation into the unlawful writing off of the T-34 tank #24-15, its abandonment on the battlefield, and actions regarding obtaining it from the repair yard.
  2. The commander of the 36th TBr must investigate the specifics of the evacuation of the tank and its repair.
  3. The results of investigations conducted by the commanders of the 36th and 168th Tank Brigades must be delivered to me by the end of June 20th, 1942, with the indication of a guilty party to hold it criminally responsible. 
  4. The commander of the 168th TBr must immediately turn over T-34 #24-15 to the 36th TBr and report by the end of the day of June 18th, 1942.
Deputy Commander of the Armoured and Motorized Forces of the 38th Army, Major General of the Tank Forces Novikov
ABTU Military Commissar, Battalion Commissar Ruzhanskiy"

Wednesday 28 November 2018

Factory #183 Experiments

"August 1st, 1940
#382s

To Chief of the 8th Department of the ABTU
Military Engineer 1st Class, Afonin

Report on experimental work for the month of July at factory #183
  1. Design bureau
    1. Two variants of a T-34 with a flamethrower have been developed. Presently, working blueprints are being composed. The deadlines outlined in the agreement are not being met.
    2. A technical project of a tractor on the T-34 chassis has been completed. Working blueprints of several components have been sent to production. The established deadlines are not being met. Production of blueprints is running 15-20 days late.
  2. Experimental plant #540
    1. Trials of the V-3 engine on an A-5 tank were performed. Trials began on July 17th, but the first outing showed that 250 hp is not enough for an A-5 tank. The engine only reached 1400 RPM in 4th gear on level terrain. After that, the engine was removed and adjusted to 300 hp. Trials resumed on July 24th. The mobility of the vehicle improved with an increase in power. The engine reaches 1800-1900 RPM on level terrain.
      As of July 31st, the engine had worked for 30 hours, after which it broke due to gas penetration.
    2. Assembly of two T-34 tanks with M-250 engines was performed. One tank was completed, and trials will begin on August 1st. The second vehicle is due for completion on August 10th.
    3. Voroshilovets tractor trials with components made with substitutes were performed. The tractor went through 1000 km of high speed trials. Towing trials remain, which will be performed in August.
    4. Two Voroshilovets tractors were assembled for installation of pneumatic controls. Installation of pneumatic controls will begin on August 1st and complete in the first half of August.
Acting regional engineer, Captain Rusakov"

Tuesday 27 November 2018

Bow Machine Guns

When tanks were used primarily for infantry support, there was no such thing as too many machineguns. Little machinegun cupolas or full on turrets were quite useful. However, as tanks evolved, the bristle of machineguns boiled down to just one in a ball mount in the front hull. Even this feature came under scrutiny, however, as this British document shows.

"As far as is known no useful progress has been made on this and as has been stated on innumerable amount of occasions before, unless the Ordnance agrees to change the shape of the front glacis plate, they are unlikely to attain a satisfactory solution. It is extremely unfortunate that no honest attempt has been made to tackle this design in the past nine months, since the short ranges of Tunisia have shown that the machine gun will come into its own and this bow machine gun with no sight is merely a means of wasting valuable ammunition. Quite recently it was reported from Tunisia that a tank had expended twice its normal complement of S.A.A. Obviously it cannot be wasted hose-piping it from an unsighted gun.

In the absence of any sight, the following alternative solution is offered. As the bow machine gun stands today, it is the weakest point of the tank. That is to say, the strongest part of the front glacis plate of the M.4 will withstand a striking velocity of 2400 f.s. from 3" A.P.C. M.62 ammunition. The bow gun represents only 1300 f.s. S.V. Officers returned from Africa are of the opinion that this bow machine gun, whether provided with a sight or no, is a waste of ammunition, since it cannot be commanded. They would much prefer twin machine guns in the co-axial mount. We continue to press the Armoured Force for this. Meanwhile, it is recommended that the whole question should be reconsidered by D.R.A.C. with the view to agreeing to the elimination of this bow machine gun in tanks as long as no sight is forthcoming."
-British Army Staff (AFV) Situation Report as on 18th July, 1943

KRSTB Radio Trials

"On the execution of factory trials of the KRSTB radio according to order #319 given on December 14th, 1939

Field trials were carried out in Mytishi-Zagorsk in Moscow oblast. Laboratory trials were carried out in laboratories #10 and 17 of NII-20.

1. Items under trial

Testers were given two complete sets of KRSTB radios. A third radio was used to create interference.

2. Goal of trials

The following was tested:
  1. Meeting of tactical-technical characteristics.
  2. Reliability of the equipment.
  3. Main electrical and design characteristics of the equipment.
3. Conditions of trials

Trials were carried out with tanks in motion: A-7 at 45-50 kph, T-26 at 25-30 kph. The air temperature was -31 degrees Celsius. Radio communication reliability was tested by passing short radio messages.

Sunday 25 November 2018

The Last of the Threes

The issues that the German PzIII medium tank encountered can be tracked by the rate of its production. Only 896 vehicles of this type, including command tanks, were built in 1940. This is a small number, especially considering that German manufacturing shifted to a wartime schedule and up to 7 factories were building this tank simultaneously. To compare, Krupp alone built 290 PzIVs in 1940, and BMM built 370 Pz38(t)s. It was only in the spring of 1941 that the PzIII rose to first place, becoming the most numerous tank built in Germany, a position it held until the end of 1942. The tank remained the most numerous in the German army until mid-1943. Today let us talk about the last variants of this tank: the PzIII Ausf.J through N.

Thursday 22 November 2018

122 mm HEAT Effectiveness

"October 20th, 1944

Report on the effectiveness of 122 mm howitzer HEAT shells

  1. 122 mm HEAT rounds were fired at a range of 4000-4500 meters using the DT scale and the stock special charge.
    Firing showed that:
    1. Calibration was performed against targets located on a hill pointed towards the battery and a flat horizontal clearing. 90-95% of the shells burst. The explosion is thermite type.
    2. When shooting at targets positioned on reverse slopes, the shells ricochet and do not explode.
    3. Firing at narrow targets from 4000-4500 meters is ineffective due to high dispersion.
      Firing at personnel is also ineffective. Compared to the HE-fragmentation grenade there are a lot fewer fragments, and thus a lot less damage is dealt.
  2. Firing at dugouts, pillboxes, tanks, or armoured cars was not performed.
Conclusions: using HEAT shells fired from a 122 mm howitzer at a range of over 2 km against enemy personnel or MG nests is unreasonable due to low effectiveness.

Chief of Staff, Captain [signature]"

Wednesday 21 November 2018

T-34 Design Improvements

"Minutes of a meeting with the factory #183 director on August 29th, 1940 on the issue of design changes to the T-34

1. Issue: on the introduction of the F-32 and 45 mm gun on the T-34.

Factory's opinion: in order to prepare production in a timely manner and make the necessary order for armour at the Ilyich factory, it is necessary to install each type of system (L-11, 45 mm, F-32) in the T-34 tank in 1940. Our queries to the BTU remain unanswered.

Decision:
  1. 200 L-11 systems will be delivered in 1940.
  2. Past that, it will be necessary to install the 45 mm gun in the turret designed for the F-32 with conversion parts.
  3. Factory #183 must investigate the issue of the possibility of installing the 45 mm gun and the F-32 in the L-11 turret by October 1st.

Tuesday 20 November 2018

Production figures

"Information summary of presence of tanks in the Red Army from January 1st, 1941, to January 1st, 1944

Tank
Inventory as of Jan 1st 1941
Produced in the first half of 1941
Produced as of Jul 1st 1941
Produced in the second half of 1941
Produced as of Jan 1st 1942
Produced in 1942
Produced as of Jan 1st 1943
Produced in 1943
Produced as of Jan 1st 1944
IS







67
67
IS-2







35
35
KV-1
141
282
423
933
1356
1802
3158

3158
KV-2
102
111
213

213

213

213
KV-1S





624
624
463
1087
KV-8





102
102

102
KV-8S





25
25
10
35
KV-85







148
148
T-35
61

61

61

61

61
T-28
502

502

502

502

502
T-29
3

3

3

3

3
T-34
115
1110
1225
1886
3111
12211
15322
15218
30540
T-O34





309
309
478
787
BT-7
4675

4675

4675

4675

4675
BT-7M
708

708

708

708

708
BT-2/5
2434

2434

2434

2434

2434
T-50



50
50
15
65

65
T-26
11090
116
11206

11206

11206

11206
T-80







75
75
T-70





4883
4883
3343
8226
T-40/60
41
181
222
1873
2095
4474
6569
55
6624
T-38
1142

1142

1142

1142

1142
T-37
2418

2418

2418

2418

2418
T-27
2581

2581

2581

2581

2581
Total
26013
1800
27813
4742
32555
24445
57000
19892
76892

Chief of the GBTU Tank Directorate, Major-General of the Tank Engineering Service, Afonin"

Via the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.